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"PLAY IN THE JOINTS BETWEEN THE RELIGION
CLAUSES"AND OTHER SUPREME COURT
CATACHRESES
CarlH. Esbeck*
Even when the U.S. Supreme Court reaches the right result in a
matter involving church-state relations, the Justices too often do so for
the wrong reasons. Cutter v. Wilkinson' is illustrative. Decided during
the Court's last term, Cutter reversed a lower court that had struck down
as unconstitutional the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act.2 Known by the clunky acronym RLUIPA, this relatively new
congressional statute tempers the impact of zoning decisions on religious
organizations, as well as assists those individuals of faith who are
incarcerated in our country's jails and penitentiaries. In these two quite
distinct arenas where regulation is pervasive, RLUIPA requires that laws
having a disparate impact on a religious organization or a particular
religious observance must yield to the needs of the religious liberty
claimant. This means that the religious claimant is exempt from the
strictures of a law generally binding on others. The exemption holds
unless officials can show that the claimant should not be excused--even
in just this one circumstance-because of likely serious public harm
such as a traffic hazard or a prison security breach.
In Cutter, the three-judge panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reasoned that RLUIPA's exemption
specifically for religious observance constituted a preference for
religion, and that the no-establishment command in the First
Amendment did not permit legislation to prefer religion over
nonreligion. That is not the law, and there was little doubt that the Sixth
Circuit's decision would not stand up on appeal. From a certain
*

R. B. Price Distinguished Professor and Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law,

University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
2. Id. at 724-25 (upholding the constitutionality of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006)).
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perspective, however, one has to empathize with the confused judges of
the circuit court. In the Supreme Court's decision in Kiryas Joel Board
of Education v. Grumet, Justice Souter did say in oft-quoted obiter
dictum that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from
"favoring ...religious adherents collectively over nonadherents. ' 3 But
the High Court, in its high-handed fashion, does not always mean what it
says. In this instance, it is a good thing. At the time of the Cutter appeal
there were no less than three prior cases (and none to the contrary)
where the Court held four-square in favor of a congressional statute that
exempted religious practices from legislative burdens that others had to
bear. It is instructive to bring them to mind. In Arver v. United States,
exemptions from the military draft for clergy and seminarians were
found not to violate the Establishment Clause.4 In Gillette v. United
States, an exemption from conscription into military service for those
who oppose war in all circumstances was upheld. 5 Finally, in
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, the Court approved a
broad
statutory
exemption
in a
civil
rights employment
nondiscrimination act for religious organizations making staffing
decisions based on religion.6
The rationale behind Arver, Gillette, and Amos is simple enough:
For regulatory legislation to exempt a religious practice is for Congress
to leave religion alone. A state does not establish religion by leaving it
alone. 7 Indeed, for government to leave religion alone reinforces a
separation between these two centers of authority-state and churchthat is good for individual religious liberty, good for the autonomy of
religious organizations, and good for the state.
The upholding of RLUIPA in Cutter should have been easy for the
Supreme Court, just another increment in a lengthening line of
precedent. It was not to be. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, a

3. 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994).
4. 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918).
5.
6.

401 U.S. 437, 460 (1971).
483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987).

7. The Establishment Clause reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .. " U.S. CONST. amend. 1. By the literal text, for Congress to enact a
law about religion generally is not prohibited. Rather, what is prohibited is a law about, more
narrowly, an "establishment" of religion. For example, it is fully consistent with the Establishment
Clause for Congress to enact comprehensive legislation requiring employers to provide
unemployment compensation to their employees, but to then exempt religious organizations from
the act. Such a religion-specific exemption is certainly to "make [a] law respecting" religion, but
more narrowly the exemption does not establish religion. See Rojas v. Fitch, 127 F.3d 184, 187-89

(lst Cir. 1997) (holding that a religion-specific exemption for faith-based organizations from
unemployment compensation tax did not violate the Establishment Clause).
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unanimous Court charted the task before it as "find[ing] a neutral course
between the two Religion Clauses," which by their nature "tend to
clash."8 Thus its assignment, as the Court saw it, was to determine if
RLUIPA fell safely in the narrows where "'there is room for play in the
joints' between the Clauses" and thus there still remained "space for
legislative action neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor
prohibited by the Establishment Clause."9 Clearly the Court
contemplates that the free-exercise and no-establishment principles run
in opposite directions, and indeed will often conflict. It is as if the Court
envisions free-exercise as pro-religion and no-establishment as, if not
anti-religion, then at least tasked to hold religion in check. Such a
view-wrongheaded, as I shall point out below-places the nine Justices
in the power seat, balancing free-exercise against no-establishment, in
whatever manner a five to four majority deems fair and square on any
given day. Such unguided balancing accords maximum power to the
Court (or worse, power to one "swing" justice), while trenching into the
power of the elected branches.
The view that the First Amendment's text, free-exercise and noestablishment, are frequently in tension, and at times are in outright war
with one another, is quite impossible. The full powers of the national
government are enumerated and limited, an original understanding later
made explicit in the Tenth Amendment. When ratified in 1791, the Bill
of Rights did not vest more power in the national government. Rather,
the fears of the Anti-Federalists, who were prominent in the First
Congress, drove them to just the opposite objective: to deny to the
central government the power to interfere with essential liberties (for
example, speech, press, jury trial) that might otherwise be implied from
the more open-ended delegations of power in the Constitution of 1787.
The Federalists, in turn, gave little resistance to this enterprise because
their position all along was that the national government had not been
delegated such powers in the first place. Indeed, James Madison, Jr., a
Federalist at this time in his career and the principal theorist behind the
1787 Constitution, led the charge for a Bill of Rights. The Federalists
harbored a different anxiety, namely, to avoid a second constitutional
convention as sought by Patrick Henry and others favoring state
sovereignty. Adding a Bill of Rights would sap whatever popular
support Henry had behind his effort. So Congress settled on the text of
the proposed articles of amendment in mid-September 1789 with little

8. 544 U.S. at 719 (quoting Walz v. Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)).
9. Id.
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more than the usual give and take. Twelve articles were submitted to the
states, but only ten were ratified. The successful articles (numbers three
through twelve) were thought to alter very little the status quo, but the
Bill of Rights did calm the anxieties of many citizens over the
centralization of national power, while serving as a useful hedge against
possible future encroachments.
Most pertinent for present purposes, each substantive clause in the
first eight amendments (the Ninth and Tenth read as truisms) was
designed to anticipate and negate the assumption of certain powers by
the national government-a government already understood to be one of
limited, enumerated powers. Thus, for example, the free-speech
provision in the First Amendment further limited national power--or,
from the Federalists' perspective, merely made clear that the central
government had never been delegated power to abridge freedom of
speech in the first place. Likewise, the free-press provision further
limited national power. These two negations on power-the speech and
press clauses-can reinforce one another but they cannot conflict.
Simply put, it is impossible for two denials of power to conflict.
Similarly, the free-exercise provision further restricted national power
and the no-establishment provision likewise restrained national power.
These two negations-the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause-can overlap and thereby doubly deny the field of permissible
governmental action, but they cannot conflict.10 Moreover, the clausesin-conflict fallacy would attribute to the drafters, the founding Congress
of 1789-90, the error of placing side by side two constitutional clauses
that work against one another. That is just too implausible to take
seriously.
The Court's wrong turn has its origin, as best I can determine, in
Widmar v. Vincent." Widmar is yet another result that is rightly decided
but for the wrong reason. The case involved a state university that
allowed student organizations to use classroom buildings to hold their
10. In candor, there is one exception to the "no conflict" logic, i.e., government-provided
religion in prisons and the armed forces. The rationale is that the free-exercise rights of a prisoner or
soldier overrides the duty on government to not establish religion. This occurs because of the
unusual situation where government has removed individuals from general society (prison or
posting at a military base), thereby preventing them from freely securing their own access to
spiritual resources. This singular exception for government-employed chaplains is sui generis;
hence it does not disprove the rule that the Religion Clauses do not conflict.
11. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). One could attribute the slip earlier in time to Walz, where the Court
wrote that it "has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which
are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash
with the other." 397 U.S. at 668-69. But Walz stopped short of saying that the solution, in the event
of a conflict, was that one clause should trump the other. Widmar took that fatal step.
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meetings. When a religious student organization sought to schedule
space to conduct meetings that included worship, the university balked,
citing the need for strict separation of church and state as required by the
Establishment Clause. The Court, relying on a long line of precedent that
prohibited the government from discriminating based on the content of
one's speech, had little trouble ordering the state university to2 give equal
access to all student organizations without regard to religion.'
If only the Justices had stopped right there. Alas, having explained
that the no-establishment principle did not justify the university's
hostility on these precise facts, the Court fatefully went on to leave open
the possibility that on a different set of facts, no-establishment could
override the students' right to freedom of speech. Once again, this is
logically impossible: two negations on governmental power can overlap
but they cannot conflict. What the Court should have said-had it been
thinking-is that a finding that the Justices thought pivotal to the result
in Widmar is that the speech in question was private speech not
government speech. Private speakers have speech rights; the government
does not have speech rights. If the worship service had been conducted
at the behest of the university (hence government speech), 13 then noestablishment rather than free-speech would have been the relevant
restraint. Instead, the Widmar Court asked if the Establishment Clause
conflicted with, and thus overrode, the Free Speech Clause. Taking that
wrong path has made all the difference. 14
12. 454 U.S. at 276.
13. Concededly, on altogether different facts it can be a close call whether the speech in
question is private or government. An example of the private versus government question being
difficult is student-initiated prayer at the opening of a public high school football game. In Santa Fe
Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe, a divided Court attributed the student's prayer to the government.
530 U.S. 290, 315-17 (2000). That seems rightly decided.
14. This pseudo clash-of-the-clauses can cause all sorts of mischief. For example, in the
logical desire to not have no-establishment in conflict with free-exercise some argue that there is but
one Religion Clause, not two. See, e.g., Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 620, 627-29 (1992) (maintaining that the no-establishment text is merely
instrumental to the free-exercise text); John T. Noonan, Jr., The End of Free Exercise?, 42 DEPAUL
L. REV. 567, 567 (1992) (making the same argument). This is grammatically correct so far as it
goes. That is, up to the first semicolon of the First Amendment there is one clause with two
adjectival participial phrases modifying the object ("no law") of the verb ("shall make"). But it is
grammatically incorrect to argue, as these commentators do, that the first participial phrase is
instrumental to the second participial phrase. Rather, each phrase is equal and operates independent
of the other.

Of course the aim of the one-Religion-Clause argument is not to correct the Court's
grammar, but to keep no-establishment and free-exercise from conflicting and thus working at
cross-purposes. The objective of these commentators is right-minded but their proposed solution is
wrong. There is a far more plausible, historically grounded, and grammatically correct way of
keeping the two participial phrases from conflicting while giving each phrase essential, independent

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1331

One might further crowd the Court with this inquiry: When two
First Amendment provisions conflict, why do the Justices choose noestablishment to override free-speech or free-exercise rather than vice
versa? Is there a sliding scale of rights in the Constitution, some more
valuable than others? Where are we to find this hierarchy of
constitutional rights, or is that too to be trusted to the balancing of nine
unelected Justices?
The Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause do not
conflict. Instead, they do different work, each in its own way protecting
religious liberty and properly ordering church-state relations.' 5 When
circumstances are such that their labors overlap, the Religion Clauses
necessarily compliment rather than conflict. Thus the Court's imagining
these two negations on governmental power as frequently clashing-two
bones grinding one upon the other at an arthritic joint that has lost its
"play"-is a dangerously misguided metaphor.

work to do in the service of religious freedom. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, Differentiating the
FreeExercise and Establishment Clauses, 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 311 (2000).

15. Id. at 323-25 (explaining that the clauses-in-conflict problem is avoided by a rights-based
free-exercise clause and a structural no-establishment clause, each in its own way protecting
religious freedom).
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